An Antidote to Efforts by Drug Manufacturers to Delay the Entry of Generic Competition via Sham Petitioning by Friedman, Ana Jemec
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 92 | Number 1 Article 6
12-1-2013
An Antidote to Efforts by Drug Manufacturers to
Delay the Entry of Generic Competition via Sham
Petitioning
Ana Jemec Friedman
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ana J. Friedman, An Antidote to Efforts by Drug Manufacturers to Delay the Entry of Generic Competition via Sham Petitioning, 92 N.C. L.
Rev. 277 (2013).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol92/iss1/6
An Antidote to Efforts by Drug Manufacturers to Delay the
Entry of Generic Competition via Sham Petitioning*
INTRODUCTION ............................................... 277
I. OVERVIEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE LANDSCAPE ............ 281
A. The Hatch-Waxman Act .................. ...... 283
B. The FDA Citizen Petition Process ........... ...... 286
C. The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act
of2007......................... ............ 288
II. ANTITRUST LIABILITY AND THE NOERR-PENNINGTON
DOCTRINE .................................................... 293
III. THE NOERR-PENNING TON DOCTRINE APPLIED ........... 297
A. Case Law ......................................... 297
1. In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation ...297
2. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co. v Sanofi-Aventis.........300
3. In re Flonase Antitrust Litigation ............... 302
4. In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation ..... ..... 304
B. Factors Supporting Possible Finding of Sham Petition ..... 307
IV. AMENDMENTS TO THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT-DID
THEY Do ENOUGH? . .. . . .. . .. . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
A. Suspect Timing ...................... ............. 311
B. Concurrent Petition Denial and ANDA Approval ............ 313
C. FDA Regulations and Practices ............. ...... 313
D. The Language of the FDA's Rejection Letter.....................314
CONCLUSION .................................................. 315
INTRODUCTION
In 2011 alone, United States consumers saved almost $200 billion
simply by using the generic equivalents of brand-name medications.
While the general public views this level of access to generic
pharmaceuticals as a positive, brand-name drug manufacturers see
the $200 billion figure as representing profits lost to generic
competitors. In fact, "[b]rand-name drug companies lose an estimated
half of their UNITED STATES sales during the first six months of
1. Ed Silverman, Generics Saved Consumers How Much Money?, PHARMALOT
(Aug. 2, 2012, 10:46 AM), http://www.pharmalot.com/2012/08/generics-saved-consumers-
how-much-money/.
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generic production alone." 2 Unsurprisingly, several of these brand-
name manufacturers have used various tactics, including sham Food
and Drug Administration ("FDA") citizen petitions, to forestall the
entry of cost-saving generic pharmaceuticals into the market,
effectively extending the brand-name manufacturers' monopolies
beyond their pharmaceuticals' patent terms.
However, generic pharmaceuticals have not always been as
readily available as they are today. Before the enactment of the
Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984,' only thirty-five percent of the top-
selling brand-name pharmaceuticals with expired patent terms had
generic counterparts.4 The Hatch-Waxman Act removed several of
the obstacles to generic manufacturers by permitting them to submit a
shortened application called the Abbreviated New Drug Application
("ANDA") and by allowing them to rely on the brand-name
manufacturer's clinical trials rather than duplicating the efforts
themselves.' As a result of the Act, virtually all top-selling
pharmaceuticals whose patent terms have expired currently face
generic competition,' and almost seventy-five percent of all
prescriptions are for generic equivalents of brand-name
pharmaceuticals.'
Despite the success of the Hatch-Waxman Act, consumers and
generic manufacturers have raised several antitrust challenges
alleging that brand-name manufacturers have manipulated the FDA
regulatory processes in an effort to extend their monopolies beyond
2. Christine S. Paine, Comment, Brand-Name Drug Manufacturers Risk Antitrust
Violations by Slowing Generic Production Through Patent Layering, 33 SETON HALL L.
REV. 479, 479 (2003).
3. Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.; 21
U.S.C.; 28 U.S.C.; 35 U.S.C.).
4. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC
DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 37
(1998), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655
/pharm.pdf (noting that the figure excludes antibiotics and drugs approved before 1962).
5. See infra Part I.A.
6. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 4, at 37 ("Before the Act (in 1983), only 35
percent of the top-selling drugs no longer under patent had generic copies available.
Today, nearly all do.").
7. See OFFICE OF SCI. & DATA POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
ASPE ISSUE BRIEF: EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS 2 (2010) [hereinafter
OFFICE OF SCI. & DATA POLICY], available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/reports/2010
/GenericDrugs/ib.pdf ("The rate of generic prescribing for all prescriptions reached almost
75 percent in 2009.").
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the expiration of their pharmaceuticals' patent terms.' One tactic used
by some brand-name manufacturers involves filing baseless citizen
petitions with the FDA. The ability to file citizen petitions with the
FDA originates in the First Amendment, which protects "the right ...
to petition the Government."' In light of this constitutional mandate,
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")o provides individuals a
forum for exercising this First Amendment right in the context of
administrative agencies." As applied to the FDA under the Hatch-
Waxman Act, the APA petition process permits the public to request
that the FDA "issue, amend, or revoke a regulation or order or take
or refrain from taking any other form of administrative action."12
Thus, any party-including a brand-name manufacturer-may submit
a petition to the FDA regarding the approval or denial of an
ANDA." In some situations, such petitions may result in the FDA
delaying ANDA approval beyond the brand-name pharmaceutical's
patent term expiration.14 These delays can restrict competition and
cost consumers millions.'" However, because this right is
constitutionally protected, parties filing citizen petitions have enjoyed
broad protection from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine, which "limit[s] the enforcement of antitrust laws against
certain private acts that urge government action."16
In an effort to curb delays due to citizen petitions, Congress
passed the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007
8. See Seth C. Silber, Jonathan Lutinski & Rachel Taylon, Abuse of the FDA Citizen
Petition Process: Ripe for Antitrust Challenge?, ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRON., Jan.
2012, at 26, 26-27, available at http://www.wsgr.com/PDFSearch/silber01l2.pdf.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . .. abridging ... the right of
the people ... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
10. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5 U.S.C.).
11. See DONALD D. BARRY & HOWARD R. WHITCOMB, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS
OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 32 (3d ed. 2005).
12. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(b) (2012).
13. See id.
14. See infra Part III.A.
15. See, e.g., Second Amended Consolidated Class Complaint and Jury Demand for
End Payors at 3, In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., No. 2:08-cv-2433, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 66312 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2011) (stating that the brand-name manufacturer's petition
delayed approval of the generic manufacturer's ANDA by four months, which allegedly
cost consumers approximately $150 million).
16. FED. TRADE COMM'N, ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE NOERR-
PENNINGTON DOCTRINE: AN FTC STAFF REPORT 1 (2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/P013518enfperspectNoerr-Penningtondoctrine.pdf; see infra
notes 103-14 and accompanying text.
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("FDAAA")." This Act stipulates that the FDA can delay the
approval of a pending ANDA only if such a delay is "necessary to
protect the public health.""
This Comment argues that in light of the broad protection of the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the FDAAA fails to adequately address
the concern that brand-name manufacturers may abuse the petition
process to achieve anticompetitive results. However, scholars have
identified several factors that have led courts to deny defendants'
motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment regarding
antitrust claims brought by consumers and generic manufacturers,
thus potentially leading to judgments against brand-name
manufacturers abusing the petition process.19 These factors can be
used to design a regulatory approach that balances the competing
goals of discouraging parties from abusing the citizen petition process
to achieve anticompetitive ends and encouraging parties to submit
petitions to raise concerns regarding the potential safety of a pending
ANDA.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an
overview of the regulatory landscape from before the enactment of
the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 through the enactment of the
FDAAA in 2007. This Part details the citizen petition process and
outlines the basis for concerns regarding abuse of this process to
achieve anticompetitive ends. Part II discusses the origins of the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine and its impact on antitrust liability. Next,
Part III examines how courts have applied this doctrine in several
antitrust cases where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant brand-
name manufacturer filed baseless citizen petitions to delay the entry
of generic competition into the market. Part III also includes an
analysis of the factors that courts have used to deny the defendant
drug manufacturers' motions for summary judgment or motions to
dismiss. These factors include (1) suspect petition filing dates; (2)
concurrent petition denial and ANDA approval; (3) FDA regulations
and practices; and (4) the language of the FDA's rejection letter.
Finally, Part IV concludes by discussing the inadequacy of the
changes to the regulatory landscape resulting from the FDAAA and
by proposing alternative regulatory schemes that address outstanding
concerns regarding anticompetitive abuse of the citizen petition
process. These alternative schemes include (1) limiting the timeframe
17. Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007) (codified in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.).
18. 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
19. See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
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during which parties with a commercial interest in the ANDA can
submit a petition that has the power to delay its approval; (2) creating
an irrebuttable presumption that when parties request relief that is
contrary to current FDA regulations and practices, the relief
requested does not have public health implications (and thus, under
the FDAAA, cannot serve as a basis for delaying approval of the
ANDA); and (3) reducing the protection of the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine by allowing the FDA to make a determination of
baselessness that can shift the burden of proof to the defendant in any
resulting court proceeding.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE LANDSCAPE
Brand-name manufacturers with patent protection over their
innovator pharmaceuticals generally charge a significant premium
over the market price within their market niche.20 Even after a brand-
name pharmaceutical's patent term expires and generic equivalents of
that pharmaceutical can legally enter the market, the brand-name
manufacturers generally choose to maintain premium prices rather
than drop their prices to compete with those of their generic
competitors, thus creating a "two-tiered market, in which price-
sensitive consumers switch to the cheaper generics while brand
loyalists stick with the higher-priced branded drugs."2' In this two-
tiered market, generic pharmaceuticals-which are comparable to
their brand-name counterparts "in dosage form, strength, route of
administration, quality, performance characteristics and intended
use"22-cost an average of eighty to eighty-five percent less than the
brand-name counterparts. 23 However, prior to the enactment of the
Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984, consumers had little access to these
20. Christopher J. Kochevar, Note, Reforming Judicial Review of Bioequivalence
Determinations, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2040, 2041 (2012).
21. John A. Rizzo & Richard Zeckhauser, Generic Script Share and the Price of
Brand-Name Drugs: The Role of Consumer Choice, 9 INT'L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. ECON.
291, 292 (2009), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rzeckhau/generic-script.pdf.
Indeed, "within six months of patent loss, more than 80% of a brand's prescription volume
is replaced by generics." Kate Rodgers, Generic Drugs Are Cheaper, but Not Always Best
Choice, FOX BUS. (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-
finance/2011/04/20/brand-vs-generic-drugs/.
22. Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA): Generics, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandAp
proved/ApprovalApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGenerics/ (last
updated July 17, 2013).
23. Facts About Generic Drugs, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs
/resourcesforyou/consumers/buyingusingmedicinesafely/understandinggenericdrugs/ucml6
7991.htm (last updated July 17, 2013).
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cheaper generic pharmaceuticals because the regulatory landscape
presented their manufacturers with several obstacles to market entry.
One obstacle faced by generic pharmaceutical manufacturers was
that after the Federal Circuit's holding in Roche Products, Inc. v.
Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.,24 generic producers were prohibited from
conducting any testing or clinical trials required for FDA approval
until the corresponding brand-name drug's patent-term expired.25
This decision resulted in a lag of approximately two years between
the brand-name pharmaceutical's patent term expiration and the
introduction of a generic equivalent.26
Further, every manufacturer-brand-name and generic-seeking
to introduce a new pharmaceutical into the market was required to
file a New Drug Application ("NDA") before the pharmaceutical was
eligible for FDA approval.27 This application process mandated that
all manufacturers prove the safety and effectiveness of their
pharmaceuticals using data from pre-clinical animal trials and human
clinical trials.28 Thus, even if the brand-name manufacturer had
already completed the necessary trials to prove safety and
effectiveness and obtained FDA approval, a manufacturer seeking
approval for the generic equivalent would have to complete its own
trials to essentially re-prove safety and effectiveness. This process of
completing the necessary trials, submitting the NDA application, and
obtaining FDA approval was time-consuming and expensive, often
requiring up to a decade or longer to complete.29 Thus, "[t]he time
and expense associated with gaining FDA approval provided little
incentive for a generic drug producer, who had to 're-prove' what the
brand-name drug companies had already established, to enter the
market."30 Due to these two obstacles, until the mid-1980s, only
24. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
25. See, e.g., Paul Wiegel, Was the FDA Exemption to Patent Infringement, 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1), Intended to Exempt a Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Activities in the
Development of New Drugs?, 2007 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F., no. 5, at 1, available at
http://bciptf.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/21-WAS-THE-FDA-EXEMPTION-TO-
PATENT-INFRINGEMENT.pdf ("It was hoped that the [Hatch-Waxman Act] would get
generic drugs to the market around two years earlier than under the prior system.").
26. Roche Prods., 733 F.2d at 864.
27. New Drug Application, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs
/DeveiopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplicat
ions/NewDrugApplicationNDAldefault.htm (last updated Feb. 21, 2013) (providing an
overview of the NDA requirement).
28. Id.
29. See Roche Prods., 733 F.2d at 864 (noting that it can take "on average from 7 to 10
years for a pharmaceutical company to satisfy the current regulatory requirements").
30. Stacey B. Lee, Is a Cure on the Way?-The Bad Medicine of Generics, Citizen
Petitions, and Noerr-Pennington Immunity, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 98,102 (2010).
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thirty-five percent of the top-selling brand-name pharmaceuticals
whose patent terms had expired had generic counterparts.31
A. The Hatch-Waxman Act
In 1984, in an effort to increase consumer access to cheaper
generic pharmaceuticals, Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act.32
This Act removes some of the obstacles to manufacturers of generic
pharmaceuticals. First, the Hatch-Waxman Act permits generic
manufacturers to begin testing and creating generic versions of an
approved brand-name pharmaceutical at any point prior to its patent
expiration, which removes the two-year lag between the brand-name
pharmaceutical's patent term expiration and the introduction of a
generic equivalent.3 3 Second, the Act authorizes manufacturers to
seek FDA approval for generic pharmaceuticals through an
accelerated process using an ANDA.34 This process eliminates the
need for generic manufacturers to perform costly and duplicative
trials "by allowing the manufacturer to rely on the safety and efficacy
data provided in the NDA for the drug's branded counterpart."3 5
However, in lieu of completing these duplicative preclinical and
clinical trials, generic manufacturers must show that their
pharmaceutical is therapeutically equivalent to its brand-name
counterpart by proving that the two products are "bioequivalent."36
Essentially, "[t]he generic version must deliver the same amount of
active ingredients into a patient's bloodstream in the same amount of
time as the innovator drug."" The cost of bioequivalence studies is a
fraction of the cost of large clinical trials required for a successful
brand-name NDA, thus enabling generic manufacturers to sell their
pharmaceuticals at much lower prices than their brand-name
31. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 4, at 27.
32. Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.; 21
U.S.C.; 28 U.S.C.; 35 U.S.C.).
33. See WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
IB10105, THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CHANGES AFFECTING
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS 2 (2004); Tamsen Valoir & Linda J. Paradiso, Patent
Strategy for Medical Products, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Sept. 2011, at 8, 9 (noting that
Hatch-Waxman "allow[s] bioequivalence testing to be performed prior to patent
expiration" so that "the FDA can now approve generic drug applications immediately on
patent expiration").
34. Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA): Generics, supra note 22.
35. In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 682 (2d Cir. 2009).
36. Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA): Generics, supra note 22.
37. Id.
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equivalents.3 8 Generally, the ANDA approval process, including
bioequivalence testing, takes approximately three to five years.3 9
Since the introduction of the Hatch-Waxman Act, virtually all
top-selling drugs whose patent terms have expired face generic
competition-compared to only thirty-five percent before its
enactment.4 0 Also, almost seventy-five percent of all prescriptions are
for generic pharmaceuticals, 41 and in 2010 alone, the use of generics
saved consumers $158 billion.4 2 Further, the increased availability of
generic pharmaceuticals has reduced Medicare's annual prescription
cost by approximately $33 billion.43
Despite the overwhelming increase in the availability of cheaper
generic pharmaceuticals resulting from the enactment of the Hatch-
Waxman Act, several antitrust challenges have been raised regarding
the efforts of brand-name manufacturers to extend their monopolies
beyond the expiration of their patent terms by manipulating the FDA
regulatory processes." First, generic manufacturers allege that brand-
name manufacturers have sought "frivolous drug patents" on
"additional features of the drug products or purified forms of the
drugs." 45 These changes in formulation, which generally yield only
''minor or no substantive therapeutic improvements," often have the
effect of shifting the market to the new formulation, thus destroying
38. Justina A. Molzon, The Generic Drug Approval Process, 5 J. PHARMACY & LAW
275, 277-78 (1995).
39. Laura Giles, Note, Promoting Generic Drug Availability: Reforming the Hatch-
Waxman Act to Prevent Unnecessary Delays to Consumers, 75 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 357, 363
(2001) (specifying that the process may take longer where there are legal challenges). If
the ANDA is submitted for the generic equivalent of a brand-name pharmaceutical
without any patent protection or with an expired patent term, then ANDA approval is
immediately effective. See SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 33, at 2. If, however, the
ANDA is submitted when the brand-name pharmaceutical's patent term is still effective
or when the brand-name pharmaceutical's patent is being challenged, then ANDA
approval will be tentative until either the brand-name pharmaceutical's patent expires or
the brand-name pharmaceutical's patent is deemed invalid. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff,
Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 189-90 (1999).
40. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 4, at 37.
41. See OFFICE OF SC. & DATA POLICY, supra note 7, at 2 ("The rate of generic
prescribing for all prescriptions reached almost 75 percent in 2009.").
42. Facts about Generic Drugs, supra note 23.
43. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS ON MEDICARE'S
PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING, at vii (2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites
/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/118xx/docll838/09-15-prescriptiondrugs.pdf ("CBO
estimates that dispensing generic drugs rather than their brand-name counterparts
reduced total prescription drug costs in 2007 by about $33 billion.").
44. See Silber et al., supra note 8, at 26-27.
45. See Paine, supra note 2, at 479-81.
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the market for generic equivalents of the original formulation.46
Another tactic involves labeling changes, including changes in the
brand-name pharmaceutical's "use code," which, due to equivalence
requirements for generic pharmaceuticals, may delay the entry of the
generic to the market.47 A third alleged exploitation involves
improperly listing invalid patents in the Orange Book and then listing
additional patents in the Orange Book subsequent to a generic
applicant's ANDA filing.48 This tactic may enable the brand-name
manufacturer to benefit from additional thirty-month stays under the
relevant provisions, thus delaying the entry of the generic to the
market.49 Further, some brand-name manufacturers have made
payments to manufacturers of generic equivalents or entered into
licensing agreements with the generic manufacturers to postpone the
introduction of approved generic equivalents to the market. 0
However, in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis,"' the Supreme
Court held that such pay-for-delay agreements can have
anticompetitive effects and are not immune to antitrust attacks.52 This
Comment focuses on a final tactic used by some brand-name
manufacturers to extend the exclusivity of their pharmaceuticals
beyond the expiration of their patent terms. This tactic involves the
brand-name manufacturer filing a baseless citizen petition with the
FDA in an effort to delay the FDA's approval of an ANDA for a
pharmaceutical's generic equivalent.53
46. Silber et al., supra note 8, at 27.
47. See id. (citing Novo Nordisk v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., 601 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (contending that the brand-name manufacturer manipulated its patent use code in
an effort to preempt anticipated generic entry)).
48. FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION:
AN FTC STUDY 39-52 (July 2002) [hereinafter GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO
PATENT EXPIRATION], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.
The Orange Book "identifies drug products approved on the basis of safety and
effectiveness by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) under the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act." Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations
(Orange Book), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/InformationOnDrugs
/ucml29662.htm (last updated Oct. 31, 2013).
49. GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION, supra note 48, at 40.
50. See id. at 25-37.
51. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
52. Id. at 2237 (noting that the Court declined to hold that "reverse payment
settlement arrangements are presumptively unlawful").
53. See infra Part III.A.
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B. The FDA Citizen Petition Process
The First Amendment guarantees the right "to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." 4 In the context of
administrative agencies, the APA provides individuals with a
mechanism for taking advantage of this First Amendment right to
petition." Specifically, the APA gives citizens the ability to petition
any administrative agency for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a
rule.56
As applied to the FDA under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the APA
petition process permits the public to request that the FDA "issue,
amend, or revoke a regulation or order or take or refrain from taking
any other form of administrative action."" Thus, any member of the
public, including a brand-name or generic pharmaceutical
manufacturer, may submit a citizen's petition to the FDA regarding
the approval or denial of an ANDA." For example, a party could
petition the FDA during its consideration of an ANDA to request
additional testing in order to assure safety or bioequivalence to the
generic pharmaceutical's brand-name counterpart." Prior to the
enactment of the FDAAA in 2007,60 the FDA was required to reply
to every citizen petition concerning an ANDA for a generic
pharmaceutical by denying the petition, approving it, or tentatively
54. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of
the people ... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."). The Supreme
Court has recognized that the right to petition is logically implicit in, and fundamental to,
the very idea of the United States' republican form of government. See, e.g., United Mine
Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967) (stating that the
right to "petition for a redress of grievances [is] among the most precious of the liberties
safeguarded by the Bill of Rights").
55. See BARRY & WHITCOMB, supra note 11, at 32 (stating that the APA created " 'a
bill of rights for the hundreds of thousands of Americans whose affairs are controlled or
regulated in one way or another by agencies of the Federal Government' " (quoting 92
CONG. REc. 2149 (1946) (statement of Sen. McCarran) reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT, 79TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 1944-1946, at 298 (1946))). The
purpose of the APA was to "provide for public participation in the rule making process."
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURES ACT 9 (1947), available at http://www.law.fsu.edulibrary/admin/1947i.html.
56. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012) ("Each agency shall give an interested person the
right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule."). Because the APA's
mandate does not define the specific procedures agencies must follow, "each federal
agency has a different process for petitions." How to File a Petition for Rulemaking, CTR.
FOR EFFECTIVE Gov'T, http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/4061 (last visited Nov. 7,
2013); see 21 C.F.R. § 10.25(a) (2013) (describing the process for petitioning the FDA).
57. 21 C.F.R. § 10.25(a).
58. See id. § 10.30(a).
59. See Giles, supra note 39, at 369.
60. See infra Part I.C (discussing the citizen petition provisions of the FDAAA).
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responding to it before the FDA could approve that ANDA.61 In
other words, "[i]f the FDA denies the [brand-name manufacturer's]
petition, or does not respond in a timely manner, the [manufacturer]
can file a lawsuit for both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief
against the Agency."6 2 Furthermore, because citizen petitions are
frequently submitted by brand-name manufacturers on the eve of
their pharmaceuticals' patent term expirations-and thus, the eve of
the potential ANDA approval date for their generic equivalents-and
because reviewing and responding to each citizen petition can take up
to six months or even longer, the consequence of this mandatory
response by the FDA was often a delay in the generic's ANDA
approval. Such a delay effectively extended the brand-name
manufacturer's monopoly beyond the pharmaceutical's patent term.
As the number of ANDAs climbed following Congress's
enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the number of citizen petitions
filed regarding ANDAs also increased, and in 2008, the FDA had a
backlog of over 1,000 citizen petitions to review.' As noted by former
FDA Chief Counsel Sheldon Bradshaw, a significant portion of the
petitions filed were
designed not to raise timely concerns with respect to the legality
or scientific soundness of approving a drug application but
rather to try to delay the approval simply by compelling the
agency to take the time to consider arguments raised in the
petition whatever their merits and regardless of whether or not
the petitioner could have made those very arguments months
and months before.65
The FDA had little trouble rejecting these petitions:
61. See 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e); Giles, supra note 39, at 369.
62. Lee, supra note 30, at 111 (citing Justina A. Molzon, The Generic Drug Approval
Process, 5 J. PHARMACY & LAW 275, 282 (1995)).
63. See The Generic Drug Maze: Speeding Access To Affordable Life-Saving Drugs
Before the Spec. Comm. On Aging, 109th Cong. 6 (2006) [hereinafter Buehler Statement]
(statement of Gary Buehler, Director, Office of Generic Drugs, Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration); Giles, supra note 39, at 369.
64. Lee, supra note 30, at 111-12 (citing Buehler Statement, supra note 63, at 5);
Martin Sipkoff, FDA Approach to Citizen Petitions May be a Mixed Blessing, MANAGED
CARE (Feb. 2008), http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0802/0802.medmgmt.html
(noting that the ANDA backlog doubled between 2006 and 2008).
65. Complaint at 10, Plumbers and Pipefitters Local 572 Health and Welfare Fund v.
Astellas Pharma US, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-11870 (D. Mass. Oct. 21, 2011) (citing Sheldon
Bradshaw, former FDA Chief Counsel, Speech at the Generic Pharmaceutical Association
Annual Policy Conference (Sept. 19, 2005)), available at http://www.wexlerwallace.com
/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Class-Action-Complaint-00218050.pdf.
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[B]etween 2003 and 2006, the FDA ruled on twenty-one citizen
petitions. The Agency determined that all but one of the
petitions lacked merit. Moreover, ten of those filings were
identified as "eleventh hour petitions"-submitted within six
months of the anticipated entry date of the generic drug. None
of the "eleventh-hour petitions" raised a meritorious health or
safety concern. Between 2001 and 2005, the FDA dismissed
seventy-six percent of the petitions it reviewed for lack of
merit.6
Although the FDA rejects most of these petitions, the rejection
may nevertheless occur after the brand-name pharmaceutical's patent
term has expired, thus extending that pharmaceutical's exclusivity.6 7
Such a delay is most likely to occur where a petition is filed in the
"eleventh hour." However, because the citizen petition process is
grounded in First Amendment rights, brand-name manufacturers can
file these "eleventh hour" citizen petitions with "virtual impunity"
against antitrust liability due to the broad protections provided by the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine.68
C. The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007
The FDA dismissed over three quarters of all citizen petitions
filed during the five-year period between 2001 and 2005 on the basis
that the petitions lacked merit.69 Further, former FDA Chief Counsel
Sheldon Bradshaw noted that a significant portion of the petitions
filed had been last minute petitions designed as an attempt to delay
ANDA approval rather than timely petitions designed to raise
legitimate concerns regarding the "legality or scientific soundness" of
approving an ANDA.7 0 Due to concerns over brand-name
manufacturers abusing the citizen petition process and other
provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress passed the
FDAAA.
Among other things, the FDAAA adds section 505(q) to the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"), which stipulates
that, for all citizen petitions submitted on or after September 27, 2007,
[t]he Secretary shall not delay approval of a pending [ANDA]
application ... because of any request to take any form of
66. Lee, supra note 30, at 112 (citations omitted).
67. See Giles, supra note 39, at 369.
68. Lee, supra note 30, at 109; see also infra Part II.
69. Lee, supra note 30, at 112 (citing Buehler Statement, supra note 63, at 4-6).
70. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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action relating to the application . . . unless ... the Secretary
determines, upon reviewing the petition, that a delay is
necessary to protect the public health.72
To determine whether a delay is necessary to protect the public
health, the FDA considers the following:
If the application were approved before the Agency completed
the substantive review of the issues in the petition and, after
further review, the Agency concluded that the petitioner's
arguments against approval were meritorious, could the
presence on the market of drug products that did not meet the
requirements for approval negatively affect the public health?73
One example identified by the FDA as potentially implicating
public health concerns is "whether a proposed generic drug product is
bioequivalent to the reference listed drug."74 When a decision is made
that a delay is necessary to protect the public health, the FDA must
provide the applicant notification of this determination of delay
within thirty days of the decision, along with a description of any
clarifications or additional data that the applicant should submit to
allow prompt review of the ANDA.75 Moreover, the FDAAA
authorizes the FDA to summarily deny any citizen petition whose
primary purpose is "delaying the approval of an application" and
which "does not on its face raise valid scientific or regulatory
issues."76 Under the original FDAAA provisions, the FDA was
required to take final action on a petition within 180 days of the
petition filing date." This 180-day timeframe has since been reduced
to a non-extendable 150 days by the FDA Safety and Innovation
Act." Taken together, these provisions reflect an effort by Congress
to minimize the occurrence of delays in ANDA approval due to sham
citizen petitions, and when such delays are deemed necessary to
72. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505(q), 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(A) (2012).
73. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., OMB CONTROL NO. 0910-0679, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CITIZEN
PETITIONS AND PETITIONS FOR STAY OF ACTION SUBJECT TO SECTION 505(q) OF THE
FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 8 (2011), available at http://www.fda.gov
/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/GuidancesUCM79353.p
df.
74. Id.
75. 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(B).
76. Id. § 355(q)(1)(E).
77. Id. § 355(q)(1)(F).
78. Pub. L. No. 112-144, § 1135, 126 Stat. 993, 1123 (2012) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 355(q)).
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"protect the public health," to implement a system where such delays
are resolved as efficiently as possible."
Included in the FDAAA is the requirement that the FDA submit
an annual report to Congress." The report must include
(A) the number of applications that were approved during the
preceding 12-month period; (B) the number of such
applications whose effective dates were delayed by petitions ...
during such period; (C) the number of days by which such
applications were so delayed; and (D) the number of such
petitions that were submitted during such period."1
The 2010 report submitted by the FDA indicated that, during the
period between October 1, 2009, and September 30, 2010, a total of
twenty citizen petitions were filed, and only one ANDA approval was
delayed for a period of nine days because of a citizen petition.8 2 The
FDA stated that its
decision to delay the approval of one pending ANDA by nine
days was based on the agency's assessment that further review
of the issues raised in the [citizen] petition was required to fully
assess the petitioners' arguments against approval. FDA was
concerned that if it approved the ANDA before resolving the
issues raised in the petition and later concluded that one or
more of the arguments against approval were meritorious, then
the presence on the market of drug products that did not meet
the requirements for approval could negatively affect the public
health. Thus, FDA decided to delay approval of the product at
issue for an additional nine days to complete its analysis of the
petition.
Ultimately, the FDA determined that further delaying the approval
of the pending ANDA was unnecessary to protect the public health,
and the agency approved it.'
79. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
80. 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(3).
81. Id.
82. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THIRD ANNUAL REPORT ON DELAYS IN APPROVALS
OF APPLICATIONS RELATED TO CITIZEN PETITIONS AND PETITIONS FOR STAY OF
AGENCY ACTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 3 (June 23, 2011) [hereinafter 2010 FDA
REPORT], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Legislation
/FederalFoodDrugandCosmeticActFDCAct/SignificantAmendmentstotheFDCAct/Fooda
ndDrugAdministrationAmendmentsActof2007/FDAAAlmplementationChart/UCM3486
62.pdf.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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Notably, in its 2010 report, the FDA indicated that the data on
implementing section 505(q) between 2008 and 2010 were insufficient
to determine whether section 505(q) was achieving its intended
effect.15 The FDA noted that since the enactment of section 505(q), it
has received "serial" citizen petitions, often from the same petitioner
regarding the same specific drug or class of drugs, and that
"[r]esponding to such serial petitions requires the use of substantial
FDA resources, on a repeated basis, over a protracted period of
time."" The FDA concluded its report by stating that "the agency is
concerned that section 505(q) may not be discouraging the
submissions of petitions that do not raise valid scientific issues and
are intended primarily to delay the approval of competitive drug
products."8
The FDA's 2011 report echoes similar sentiments." During the
period between October 1, 2010, and September 30, 2011, a total of
twenty citizen petitions were filed-the same number as in 2010-and
only one ANDA approval was delayed due to a citizen petition, but
this time, the delay was seventy-eight days.89 The seventy-eight-day
delay was due to the FDA's concern that
if it approved the ANDA before resolving the issues raised in
the petitions and later concluded that one or more of the
arguments against approval were meritorious, then the
presence on the market of drug products that did not meet the
requirements for approval could negatively affect the public
health.90
At the end of its review, the FDA again determined that further
delaying the approval of the pending ANDA was unnecessary to
protect the public health, and the agency approved the pending
ANDA.9 1 As in the 2010 report, the FDA noted that "serial" petitions
burden FDA resources and concluded that "the agency is concerned
85. Id. at 4.
86. Id. at 5.
87. Id.
88. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT ON DELAYS IN APPROVALS
OF APPLICATIONS RELATED TO CITIZEN PETITIONS AND PETITIONS FOR STAY OF
AGENCY ACTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 6 (Dec. 14, 2012) [hereinafter 2011 FDA
REPORT], available at http://www.hpm.com/pdf/blog/FDA%20FY2011%20505q%20CP
%20Report.pdf.
89. Id. at 3-4.
90. Id. at 3.
91. Id. ("This delay had no impact on the marketing of the product because, as a
result of a court's patent decision, the holder of the ANDA is enjoined from marketing the
product for several years.").
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that section 505(q) may not be discouraging the submissions of
petitions that do not raise valid scientific issues and are intended
primarily to delay the approval of competitive drug products."' The
FDA added that over the four-year period during which the Agency
has been reviewing 505(q) citizen petitions, approximately five
percent of the petitions received delayed ANDA approval. 93 Further,
the FDA criticized the FDAAA provisions, stating that "[t]hough
many 505(q) petitions do not necessarily raise issues that are
important to the public health, the statute requires FDA to prioritize
these petitions over other matters ... that do raise important health
concerns."94 Consequently, the FDA stated that it "remains
concerned about the resources required to respond to 505(q)
petitions within the statutory deadline at the expense of completing
the other work of the agency." 5
As the nine-day delay to ANDA approval in the 2010 report and
the seventy-eight-day delay in the 2011 report indicate, under the
provisions of the 2007 FDAAA, brand-name manufacturers may still
have the ability to delay ANDA approval for their generic
competitors even if the issues in their citizen petitions do not
implicate public health concerns. This delay would occur for at least
the duration of time it takes the FDA to make a determination of
whether a petition has the potential to implicate public health
concerns. Notably, a delay of generic entry to the market for a period
as short as nine days could be costly to consumers. For example, in In
re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation,96 the delayed entry of the
generic to the market allegedly cost consumers $37 million per
month, the equivalent of over $11 million for a nine-day period.97
Further, the FDA's discussion of "serial" petitioning raises an
additional concern regarding cost. According to the FDA, "serial"
petitioning substantially burdens the Agency's resources, including
92. Id. at 6.
93. Id. at 5.
94. Id. at 6.
95. Id.
96. No. 2:08-cv-2433, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66312 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2012).
97. Second Amended Consolidated Class Complaint and Jury Demand for End
Payors at 3, In re Wellbutrin XL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66312. Another example of the
costs associated with delays occurred with the brand-name pharmaceutical Ditropan XL.
Kohl, Leahy Introduce Bill to Stop Frivolous Citizen Petitions, Speed Generic Drug
Approval, U.S. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING: PRESS ROOM (Sept. 28, 2006),
http://www.aging.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=268246. The patent owners submitted a citizen
petition to the FDA one month before the generic equivalent, Ozybutynin, was expected
to be approved for sale. Id. The FDA reviewed the petition for over a year while Ditropan
XL generated "more than $1.8 million in sales, daily." Id.
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financial resources. 98 The Agency is financed primarily through user
fees, including fees paid by pharmaceutical manufacturers seeking
approval of their products, and increases in the FDA budget lead to
higher user fees.9 9 Presumably, pharmaceutical manufacturers would
pass any fee increases to consumers via increased prices.
II. ANTITRUST LIABILITY AND THE NOERR-PENNINGTON
DOCTRINE
The purpose of the Sherman Antitrust Actt oo is "[t]o protect the
consumers by preventing arrangements designed, or which tend, to
advance the cost of goods to the consumer.""'1 Based on its purpose,
the Act would seem to prohibit brand-name manufacturers from
extending their monopolies beyond the expiration of their
pharmaceuticals' patent terms by filing citizen petitions that lack
merit, thus delaying the entry of cheaper generic equivalents to the
market.102 However, because the right to petition the federal
government is constitutionally protected,103  brand-name
manufacturers have enjoyed broad protection against liability arising
from such seemingly anticompetitive citizen petitions."
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc.,"o' the Supreme Court considered whether lobbying the
legislature "to seek passage or defeat of legislation" could subject an
98. 2011 FDA REPORT, supra note 88, at 6; 2010 FDA REPORT, supra note 82, at 5.
99. See John LaMattina, Is the FDA Being Compromised by Pharma Payments?,
FORBES (Aug. 7, 2013, 8:48 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/2013/08/07/is-
the-fda-being-compromised-by-pharma-payments/; Joseph M. Mercola, FDA Wants More
Money, Claims They Are a "Bargain", MERCOLA.COM (May 1, 2013),
http://articles.mercola.com/sites/articles/archive/2013/05/01/fda-budget-increase.aspx.
100. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-8, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)).
101. Will Entrekin, Why the DoJ Lawsuit is Good for eBooks, HUFFINGTON POST
(Apr. 12, 2012) (quoting Senator John Sherman), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/will-
entrekin/doj-lawsuit-good-for-ebooks b1422380.html.
102. See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993) ("The
purpose of the Act is not to protect businesses from the working of the market; it is to
protect the public from the failure of the market. The law directs itself not against conduct
which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy
competition itself."); D.R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 236 U.S. 165, 173-74
(1915) ("[T]he Anti-Trust Act was intended in the most comprehensive way to provide
against combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce, the
monopolization of trade or commerce or attempts to monopolize the same.").
103. U.S. CONST. amend. I (preserving "the right of the people... to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances"); see supra Part I.B.
104. Lee, supra note 30, at 109.
105. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
2013] 293
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
individual or group of people to antitrust liability."' The Court held
that antitrust liability under the Sherman Act cannot be premised on
''mere solicitation of governmental action with respect to the passage
and enforcement of laws," even if such activities are deceptive in
nature.'07 This decision was followed by United Mine Workers of
America v. Pennington,os where the Supreme Court expanded the
Noerr holding beyond the legislative branch by excluding "[j]oint
efforts to influence public officials" from antitrust liability even if
such efforts are "intended to eliminate competition.""' Finally, in
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,"0 the Supreme
Court further defined the breadth of this doctrine by stating that the
constitutional right to petition extends to "all departments of the
Government," including the legislative branch, the executive branch,
and the judiciary."' As such, the Court held that parties exercising
this right were immune from antitrust liability."2 This trilogy of cases
established the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which "limit[s] the
enforcement of the antitrust laws against certain private acts that urge
government action."" 3 Through this doctrine, brand-name
manufacturers petitioning the FDA regarding ANDAs have received
broad protection from antitrust liability."4 However, the protection
offered by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is not absolute.
In Noerr, the Supreme Court first discussed potential limitations
to the protection afforded by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. There,
the Court noted that "there may be situations in which a publicity
campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental
action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be
106. Id. at 135. The Court stated that "[t]he right of petition is one of the freedoms
protected by the Bill of Rights." Id. at 138.
107. Id. at 138, 145; see also Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119, 122 (3d
Cir. 1999) (stating that a party exercising its First Amendment right to "petition[] the
government for redress generally is immune from antitrust liability").
108. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
109. Id. at 670.
110. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
111. Id. at 510.
112. Id. at 510-11 ("We conclude that it would be destructive of rights of association
and of petition to hold that groups with common interests may not, without violating the
antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to
advocate their causes and points of view respecting resolution of their business and
economic interests vis-d-vis their competitors.").
113. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 16, at 1.
114. See, e.g., Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 1999)
(acknowledging the "broad immunity" provided by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine).
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justified.""' The Supreme Court reiterated this sham exception in
California Motor Transport Co. and extended its application beyond
the lobbying context by stating that "[m]isrepresentations, condoned
in the political arena, are not immunized when used in the
adjudicatory process.""' Subsequently, in Professional Real Estate
Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.,"' the Supreme
Court laid out the two-pronged test used to determine whether a
party's conduct falls within the sham exception, thus excluding that
party from Noerr-Pennington immunity."s The case discussed the
sham exception only in the context of litigation, but the same test
applies to petitions submitted to administrative agencies.119
The first prong of this sham exception test is the objective prong.
Under this prong, plaintiffs arguing that a defendant's conduct falls
within the sham exception must show that the petition was
objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable [party]
could realistically expect success on the merits. If an objective
[party] could conclude that the [petition] is reasonably
calculated to elicit a favorable outcome, the [petition] is
immunized under Noerr, and an antitrust claim premised on the
sham exception must fail.120
This showing of a realistic expectation of success on the merits has
been referred to as "probable cause."121
If the first prong is satisfied, analysis moves to the second prong,
an examination of "the litigant's subjective motivation."'22 Under the
second prong, the issue is whether the conduct in question "conceals
115. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144
(1961).
116. Cal. Motor Transp. Co., 404 U.S. at 513.
117. 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
118. Id. at 60-61.
119. See In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 694 (2d Cir.
2009) (applying the two prongs of the Profl Real Estate Investors test to a citizen petition
filed with the FDA); Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 1999)
(applying the two prongs of the test to petitions to the International Trade Commission
and the Department of Commerce); see also In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 795 F. Supp. 2d
300, 309 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (applying the two prongs of the test to citizen petitions filed with
the FDA).
120. Prof'1 Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60; see also Cheminor, 168 F.3d at 122-23
(discussing whether a petitioner could "realistically expect" to succeed on the merits of a
petition).
121. See, e.g., Prof'1 Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 62 ("The existence of probable
cause to institute legal proceedings precludes a finding that an antitrust defendant has
engaged in sham litigation.").
122. Id. at 60.
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'an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor.' "123 To prevail, plaintiffs must show that "the subjective
intent of the petitioning party was to inhibit competition, rather than
to petition the Government for redress." 124
Though this sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
applies to alleged anticompetitive activity directed at any of the three
branches of government, courts have refused to apply it uniformly. 125
For example, in the context of citizen petitions to the FDA, the
District Court for the Central District of California reasoned, "[T]o
the extent a citizen petition urges the FDA to exercise administrative
discretion, the process more closely resembles traditional legislative
or executive lobbying. In this context, courts must exercise great
caution, if not abstain from interfering with the process entirely." 26
Thus, despite the sham exception, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is
still "[o]ne of the most significant hurdles for [antitrust] plaintiffs"
alleging that a brand-name manufacturer has used the citizen petition
process to "unlawfully monopolize the market for a particular
drug."' 27 A further challenge to antitrust plaintiffs is that, if a petition
contains multiple claims, courts have held that "conduct is not a sham
if 'at least one claim in the [petition] has objective merit.' "128
123. Id. at 60-61 (quoting E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961)).
124. In re Flonase, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 311 (citing Prof'l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S.
at 60-61).
125. Compare Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., No. 5:03-00887-MRP,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132345, at *55-56 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2009) (granting the brand-
name manufacturer's motion to dismiss), and M. Sean Royall & Joshua Lipton, The
Complexities of Litigating Generic Drug Exclusion Claims in the Antitrust Class Action
Context, 24 ANTITRUST 22, 23 (2010) ("[B]ecause a citizen petition can be more akin to
legislative or executive lobbying than to an adjudicatory process, such petitions are
arguably entitled to even broader Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunity than applies to
court proceedings."), with In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677,
686 (2d Cir. 2009) (overturning dismissal and acknowledging sufficiency of the plaintiff's
allegations to demonstrate defendant's FDA petition was a sham), and Kottle v. Nw.
Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056, 1062 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that "the exact scope of the sham
exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine has not always been clear in the
administrative context" but finding it applicable to "a sufficiently circumscribed form of
administrative authority" that is not "essentially political").
126. Aventis Pharma S.A., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132345, at *40.
127. Silber et al., supra note 8, at 30.
128. In re Flonase, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 312 (quoting Dentsply Int'l, Inc. v. New Tech.
Co., No. 06-272, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19846, at *9 (D. Del. Dec. 19, 1996)).
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III. THE NOERR-PENNING TON DOCTRINE APPLIED
A. Case Law
Although the citizen petition process has raised concerns
regarding potential anticompetitive abuse of the petition process by
brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers, "[t]he FTC has not
brought any enforcement action premised on frivolous or untimely
citizen petitions." 2 9 However, several courts have applied the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine to address allegations of defendant brand-name
manufacturers abusing the citizen petition process by filing sham
petitions to achieve anticompetitive ends.130
1. In re DDA VP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation
In In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation,' the
Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to
plausibly demonstrate that the defendants' petitions could be sham
petitions and thus denied the defendant brand-name manufacturer's
motion to dismiss.132 In that case, Barr Laboratories, Inc. ("Barr")
had filed an ANDA for a generic version of desmopressin
("DDAVP").13 3 After Barr filed the ANDA, Ferring Pharmaceuticals
("Ferring"), the owner of the DDAVP patent, filed a citizen petition
urging the FDA to require Barr to conduct and submit additional
tests in order for Barr to establish the bioequivalence of its generic to
DDAVP.'34 The FDA rejected Ferring's petition, stating that Ferring
129. Laura S. Shores, Pharmaceutical Patent Life Extension Strategies: Are REMS
Programs Next?, ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRON., Mar. 2012, at 19, 22, available at
http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications-article.aspx?ArticleKey=2335#20.
130. See discussion infra Part III.A.1-4.
131. 585 F.3d 677 (2d Cir. 2009).
132. Id. at 695.
133. Id. at 682. DDAVP is used to treat "the symptoms of a certain type of diabetes
insipidus," "bed-wetting," and "excessive thirst and the passage of an abnormally large
amount of urine that may occur after a head injury or after certain types of surgery."
NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, Desmopressin Oral, MEDLINEPLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov
/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a608010.html (last reviewed Sept. 1, 2010).
134. In re DDA VP, 585 F.3d at 685. This petition was filed over a year before the
DDAVP patent was ruled invalid. Id. at 687. The District Court for the Southern District
of New York held that the patent was "unenforceable due to inequitable conduct before
the PTO by Ferring and its agents." Id. at 683; see Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., No. 02
Civ. 9851, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3597, at *29 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2005), affd, 437 F.3d 1181
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
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offered " 'no convincing evidence' " and that its arguments lacked
" 'any basis' " of support."3
Subsequently, direct purchasers of DDAVP filed complaints
against both Ferring, the patent owner, and Aventis Pharmaceuticals
("Aventis"), the DDAVP marketer and NDA-holder, alleging that
they "abused the patent system to unlawfully maintain a monopoly
over [a drug]" through anticompetitive acts, including " 'filing a sham
citizen petition to further delay FDA final approval of Barr's
ANDA.' "136 The plaintiffs further alleged that these anticompetitive
acts by the defendants delayed the entry of lower-priced generic
pharmaceuticals, thus forcing them to pay "supra-competitive
prices."' 37 The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' sham citizen
petition claim, noting that the defendants had not acted in subjective
bad faith.138 Specifically, the district court found that the citizen
petition was "First Amendment protected activity even though delay
of Barr's access to the market was foreseeable."139
On appeal, the Second Circuit emphasized the sham exception to
the broad protection afforded by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,
stating that "[w]hen petitioning activity 'ostensibly directed toward
influencing governmental action[] is a sham ... to cover what is ...
nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor[, then] the application of the Sherman
Act would be justified.' "140 The Second Circuit found that the
defendants' petition fell within the sham exception to the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine and reversed the district court's dismissal of the
plaintiffs' sham citizen petition claim.14' In reaching this holding, the
Second Circuit focused on the language used by the FDA in its
rejection letter to Ferring, which stated that Ferring's petition "had
no convincing evidence" and lacked "any basis" for its arguments. 42
The court further relied on the district court's statement that
Ferring's citizen petition was a tactic " 'motivated by a desire to keep
135. In re DDA VP, 585 F.3d at 694 (quoting Complaint at 115, In re DDA VP, 585 F.3d
677 (No. 06-5535-CV)).
136. Id. at 682-83 (quoting Complaint at 115, In re DDAVP, 585 F.3d 677 (No. 06-
5535-CV)).
137. Id. at 685, 688.
138. In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 05 Cv. 2237, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 96201, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2006).
139. Id. at *23.
140. In re DDA VP, 585 F.3d at 686 (quoting E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961)).
141. Id. at 695.
142. Id. at 694 (citation omitted).
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out competition for as long as possible after the expiration of the
patent.' "143 Also, during the initial litigation, the Southern District of
New York had deemed Ferring's DDAVP patent invalid "due to
inequitable conduct before the PTO by Ferring and its agents." 144
Although Ferring's petition was submitted well before the DDAVP
patent was held unenforceable (rather than on the eve of the patent
term's expiration), the Second Circuit reasoned that the DDAVP
patent "became unenforceable almost five months before the FDA
rejected the citizen petition. During that time, the defendants were
free to 'supplement, amend, or withdraw' the petition, which at that
point they knew to be based upon an unenforceable patent[,]" but
they failed to do so.145 Finally, the fact that the FDA ultimately
approved the generic pharmaceutical on the same day that it rejected
Ferring's citizen petition supported the plaintiffs' allegations that the
petition delayed the entry of the generic to the market. 46 These
factors led the court to find that the plaintiffs' allegations were
sufficient to plausibly demonstrate that Ferring's petitions were a
sham.147 Ultimately, the parties entered a settlement agreement
requiring Ferring and Aventis to pay $20.25 million to the plaintiff
class.'48
143. Id. (quoting Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., No. 02 Civ. 9851, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3597, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2005), aff'd, 437 F.3d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
144. Id. at 683; see Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., No. 02 Civ. 9851, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3597, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2005), aff'd, 437 F.3d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
145. In re DDAVP, 585 F.3d at 687 (citations omitted) (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(g)
(2009)).
146. Id. at 694.
147. Id. at 695.
148. Health Care and Pharm. Comm., A.B.A. Antitrust Section, Ferring and Aventis
Agree to $20.25 M Settlement with Class of DDAVP Direct Purchasers, RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS, Sept. 2011, at 3, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam
/aba/publications/antitrust law/at301000_recentdev_201109.authcheckdam.pdf. This
settlement agreement covered all of the claims in the case:
(1) "[plrocuring the 398 patent by committing fraud and/or engaging in inequitable
conduct before the PTO," (2) "[i]mproperly listing the fraudulently obtained 398
patent in the [FDA's] Orange Book," thereby enabling patent infringement claims
against potential competitors, (3) prosecuting sham infringement litigation against
generic competitors, and (4) "filing a sham citizen petition to further delay FDA
final approval of Barr's ANDA."
In re DDA VP, 585 F.3d at 683 (alterations in original) (quoting Complaint at 144, In re
DDA VP, 585 F.3d 677 (No. 06-5535-CV)).
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2. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co. v Sanofi-Aventis
Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co. v Sanofi-Aventisl 49 is another case
in which a court found that the defendant's citizen petition could
potentially fall within the sham exception of the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine and therefore denied the defendant's motion to dismiss."'o
There, Louisiana Wholesale Drug Company ("Louisiana Wholesale")
filed a complaint against Aventis alleging that Aventis unlawfully
delayed the entry of generic competitors of Arava to the market by
filing a sham citizen petition.'"' On the end date of Arava's patent
term-and thus, the end of its exclusivity-five generic manufacturers
submitted ANDAs for generic versions of two of the three available
strengths of Arava (the 10mg and 20mg strengths, but not the 100mg
strength). 52 Aventis then filed a citizen petition with the FDA on the
day before generic approval for 10mg and 20mg leflunomide (generic
Arava), requesting that the FDA approve the ANDAs only if they (1)
contained bioequivalence studies confirming that five 20mg tablets of
the generic are bioequivalent to one 100mg Avara tablet or (2) sought
approval for a 100mg dose of the generic.'53
After a delay of over five months, the FDA finally approved the
ANDAs for the generic manufacturers on the same day that it denied
Aventis's citizen petition, stating that Aventis's citizen petition
"seem[ed] to be based on a false premise" that a generic
manufacturer recommending the 100mg dose on its label has to either
produce its own 100mg tablet or recommend using five 20mg
tablets.'54 The FDA noted that a generic manufacturer could in fact
recommend a dosage on its label-in this case, 100mg-that differs
from the standard doses the manufacturer actually manufactures."'
Moreover, no regulations require generic applicants to seek approval
for all strengths of a brand-name pharmaceutical.'56
149. No. 07-CIV-7343, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77206 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2009).
150. Id. at *3-4.
151. Id. at *3. Arava is used to treat rheumatoid arthritis. NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH,
Leflumonide, MEDLINEPLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds
/a600032.html (last reviewed Mar. 16, 2011).
152. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77206, at *4-5; La. Wholesale
Drug Co. v. Sanofi-Aventis, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81328, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2008).
153. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77206, at *6. In support of its
petition, Aventis noted that a previous patent licensee for Arava had submitted a request
to the FDA "to permit five 20 mg tablets to serve as an alternative to the 100 mg tablet
loading dose without a showing of bioequivalence." Id. at *6-7. The FDA had rejected
that request. Id.
154. Id. at *7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
155. Id. at *8.
156. Id.
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After the FDA's rejection of Aventis's citizen petition, Louisiana
Wholesale filed suit alleging that (1) the citizen petition was both
objectively and subjectively baseless, thus falling within the sham
exception of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, and that (2) as a result of
the petition, generic competition to Avara was delayed."' The district
court agreed and denied Aventis's motion for summary judgment.'
The court focused on the fact that, as a sophisticated manufacturer,
Aventis was familiar with FDA regulations and would not reasonably
have believed that its citizen petition was viable.' Also, the court
noted that Aventis had previously listed pharmaceutical strengths
that the company itself did not manufacture on generic and brand-
name labels.160 The case ultimately proceeded to a jury trial, and the
jury unanimously found for Aventis, concluding that Louisiana
Wholesale had failed to prove that Aventis's citizen petition was
"objectively baseless." 6' Although the district court denied Louisiana
Wholesale's motion for judgment as a matter of law or new trial
because Louisiana Wholesale failed to show either that there was a
complete lack of evidence supporting the jury's verdict or that there
was an " 'overwhelming amount of evidence in [its] favor,' " the case
still illustrates how courts are turning an increasingly skeptical eye
towards brand-name manufacturers' citizen petitions.'62
157. Id. at *8-9.
158. La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Sanofi-Aventis, No. 07 Civ. 7343, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 81328, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2008).
159. Id. at *12-13 ("No reasonable pharmaceutical manufacturer could have expected
Aventis's Citizen Petition to succeed on the merits because Aventis ignored the law by
requesting relief that was contrary to existing law and precedent. As I held previously,
ignoring the law, filing administrative or legal actions that do not request reasonable
extensions or development of the law and mischaracterization of the relevant issues or
legal standards exemplify objectively baseless actions.").
160. Id. at *15-16 ("But Defendants knew that drug manufacturers were permitted
under FDA regulations to cross-reference other drugs and dosages because they
themselves did so in two instances." (citing Def. Ex. 73, FDA Denial of Petition)).
161. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77206, at *9. In reaching this
conclusion, the jury relied on Aventis's evidence that (1) the FDA had not yet addressed
the loading dose issue raised in this case; (2) the defendant drug manufacturers had
approached this loading dose inconsistently, thus indicating that the issue is unsettled; and
(3) "in reviewing the ANDAs for generic leflunomide, the FDA took action consistent
with some of the views espoused by Aventis in the Citizen Petition." Id. at *17-22.
162. See id. at *22 (quoting Galdieri-Ambrosini v. Nat'l Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d
276, 289 (2d Cir. 1998)).
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3. In re Flonase Antitrust Litigation
A third case where a court initially denied the defendant's
motion for summary judgment is In re Flonase Antitrust Litigation.163
There, Roxane Laboratories ("Roxane"), the manufacturer of the
generic version of Flonase, along with direct and indirect purchasers
of Flonase, filed lawsuits against Glaxo-Smith Klein PLC ("GSK"),
the manufacturer of Flonase, alleging that GSK filed a series of sham
petitions to the FDA in an attempt to delay the entry of generic
Flonase to the market.'" The FDA had approved Roxane's ANDA
and rejected all of GSK's petitions on the same day, stating in its
rejection letter that "GSK [is] not ... permitted to shield its market
share when the Agency has reasonably determined that competing
generic drug products may be approved."16 After this rejection, GSK
filed a lawsuit in the District of Maryland for a temporary restraining
order and a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Roxane from
selling generic Flonase and attempting to reverse the FDA's denial of
its citizen petition.'" The District Court for the District of Maryland
initially granted the restraining order but subsequently denied GSK's
motion for a preliminary injunction. 67
In each of the three resulting Flonase antitrust lawsuits against
GSK filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by direct purchasers
of Flonase, indirect purchasers of Flonase, and Roxane, GSK moved
for summary judgment, claiming immunity from antitrust liability
163. 815 F. Supp. 2d 867 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
164. Id. at 871-72. GSK's exclusivity over Flonase was set to expire on April 14, 2004.
See Silber et al., supra note 8, at 33. Roxane had submitted its ANDA in October of 2002.
Id. "During the period between May 2004 through June 2005, GSK made a series of
petitions to the FDA regarding the FDA's approval of the ANDAs for Flonase." Id. The
FDA did not reject GSK's petitions and approve the ANDA until February of 2006,
almost two years after the end of Flonase's exclusivity. Id. Flonase is used to treat
"sneezing and stuffy, runny, or itchy nose" associated with "seasonal (occurs only at
certain times of year), and perennial (occurs all year round) allergic rhinitis and perennial
nonallergic rhinitis." NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, Fluticasone Nasal Spray, MEDLINEPLUS,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a695002.html (last reviewed Sept. 1,
2010).
165. Letter from Randall W. Lutter, Acting Assoc. Comm'r for Policy and Planning,
Food and Drug Admin., to Frederick H. Branding, McGuireWoods, LLP, et al. 24 (Feb.
22, 2006), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2004-P-0152-
0005.
166. See Complaint at 30-31, Glaxo Grp. Ltd. v. Leavitt, No. AMD-06cv469, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10938 (D. Md. Feb. 23, 2006), ECF No. 1.
167. See Temporary Restraining Order at 1-2, Glaxo Grp. Ltd., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10938 (No. AMD-06cv469); Order at 1, Glaxo Grp. Ltd., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10938
(No. AMD-06cv469).
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under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.'" GSK conceded that the
plaintiffs had provided enough evidence to satisfy the subjective
prong of the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.169
Thus, the only issue was whether GSK's conduct was "objectively
baseless" because its petition had no realistic expectation of
success.7 0 The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
held that for each of GSK's six citizen petitions there was a genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether GSK's conduct was
"objectively baseless" and thus denied GSK's motion for summary
judgment."'
GSK had first requested that the FDA refrain from approving
Roxane's ANDA until after the agency issued final guidance on nasal
aerosols and nasal sprays, which was still in draft form at the time of
GSK's petition.'72 The FDA rejected this request, stating that
although it is "desirable" to issue final guidance prior to ANDA
approval, doing so "is not always possible."'73 The District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania noted that because the FDA is
not obligated to issue guidance, and because ANDA applicants are
not required to use such guidance, this request was contrary to the
agency's regulations and practices and could therefore be found
objectively baseless.'74 GSK also requested that the FDA require
ANDAs to include data from certain studies that are not required by
law."' Because such data is not required by law, the court reasoned
that the petition could also be a sham.'76 The court further found that
genuine issues of fact remained regarding GSK's final four
petitions."'7 Because genuine issues of fact remained with regard to
168. In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 795 F. Supp. 2d 300, 302 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
169. Id. at 311.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 317.
172. Id. at 305. The FDA had issued a draft guidance regarding this issue in 1999,
which it later amended in 2003, but the guidance was never finalized. Id. at 304-O5.
173. Id. at 305.
174. Id. at 312. This request was contrary to FDA regulations and practices. Id.
175. Id. at 313.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 317. The court also considered GSK's lawsuit seeking a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction. GSK argued that because the court initially
granted the temporary restraining order before denying GSK's motion for preliminary
injunction, its petitions were not objectively baseless (the reasoning being that the court
would not have initially granted the temporary restraining order if it believed that GSK
had no realistic expectation of success on the merits of the case). Id. at 316. However, the
court rejected this argument, stating that a temporary restraining order grant does not
itself establish an objective basis for petitioning activity. Id. at 316-17. Instead, the court
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whether GSK acted objectively baseless by filing all six petitions, the
court denied GSK's motion for summary judgment." In January
2013, the parties reached a settlement agreement of $150 million for
direct purchasers and $35 million for indirect purchasers, which was
approved by the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in June 2013.179
4. In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation
There are also examples of cases where the defendant brand-
name manufacturer was successful in seeking protection under the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine and the manufacturer's motion to dismiss
or motion for summary judgment was granted.'s In In re Wellbutrin
XL Antitrust Litigation,8"' Wellbutrin XL purchasers filed a suit
against Biovail, Wellbutrin XL's manufacturer, for "illegally
conspiring to prevent generic versions of Wellbutrin XL from
entering the American market by filing sham patent infringement
lawsuits and a citizen petition with the [FDA], and entering into
agreements with generic companies to settle the lawsuits."182 One of
stated that the ultimate denial of GSK's preliminary injunction motion provides evidence
that that lawsuit itself was objectively baseless. Id. at 316-17.
178. Id. at 317.
179. In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., No. 08-cv-3149, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83976, at *2-
3 (E.D. Pa. June 14, 2013) (approving the settlement agreement for direct purchasers);
Med. Mut. of Ohio v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., Nos. 08-3301 and 12-4212, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 85926, at *44 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 2013) (approving the settlement agreement
for indirect purchasers).
180. See, e.g., Aventis Pharma, S.A. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, No. 5:03-00887-
MRP, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132345, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2009) (granting Aventis's
motion to dismiss).
181. No. 08-2431, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66312 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2012) (granting
partial summary judgment).
182. Id. at *4. Specifically,
[t]he Citizen Petition requested that the FDA require any ANDA for a generic
version of Wellbutrin XL to satisfy the following four criteria:
(1) All bioequivalence trials should calculate and evaluate parameters based on
concentrations of the parent drug and active metabolites; ...
(2) Any generic formulation should be shown to be bioequivalent to Wellbutrin
XL, sustained release and immediate release bupropion; ...
(3) The bioequivalence studies should be conducted at steady-state evaluating the
performance of the dosage form based on AUC, Cmax, Cmin; ... and
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the plaintiffs' allegations was that Biovail filed a baseless FDA citizen
petition.' Approximately one year after Biovail's petition was filed,
the FDA granted it in part and denied it in part, stating that brand-
name manufacturers have no "right to be free of generic competition"
after their patents expire or are held unenforceable and that "Biovail
[should] not be permitted to shield its market share."'" The plaintiffs
alleged that Biovail's petition delayed approval of the generic
manufacturer's ANDA by four months, which allegedly cost
consumers approximately $150 million."'
However, the court noted that Biovail's citizen petition did
include some successful arguments and held that the plaintiffs failed
to meet the threshold requirement of presenting evidence that "the
unsuccessful and arguably sham requests in the Citizen Petition
actually delayed FDA approval of the generic ANDAs any further
than the delay caused by the successful requests." 86 Thus, the
plaintiffs did not allege an antitrust injury, which is a necessary
element of every antitrust claim.8 Despite this missing element, the
(4) Data using the FDA's approach for evaluating the effect of alcohol on the
performance of the controlled-release dosage form should be required to ensure
the absence of "dose dumping."
Id. at *62-63. Wellbutrin XL is used to treat depression and seasonal affective disorder
and is also used "to help people stop smoking." NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, Bupropion,
MEDLINEPLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a695033.html (last
revised Sept. 15, 2013).
183. In re Wellbutrin XL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66312, at *4.
184. Letter from Randall W. Lutter, Acting Assoc. Comm'r for Policy and Planning,
Food and Drug Admin., to John B. Dubeck, Keller and Heckman LLP at 16 (Dec. 14,
2006), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2005-P-0366-
0004.
185. Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand for
End Payors at 3, In re Wellbutrin XL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66312. Biovail made the
following arguments in favor of its motion for summary judgment as to the Citizen
Petition: (1) Because the petition was granted in part,
the entire petition is immunized from antitrust liability under the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine; (2) Second, that any competitive harm is immune from
antitrust liability because it resulted from government decision; (3) Third, that
even if the entire petition is not immunized, the unsuccessful requests were not
objectively baseless; and (4) Finally, that even if the unsuccessful requests were
objectively baseless, the plaintiffs have not shown that they caused any delay.
In re Wellbutrin XL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66312, at *71.
186. In re Wellbutrin XL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66312, at *83. The court raised the
question of whether a mixed petition (a petition where some, but not all, of the claims
were successful) should be immune; however, it did not answer this question because the
Plaintiffs did not meet the threshold requirement of showing that the Citizen Petition
further delayed the ANDA approval. Id.
187. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
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court still addressed Biovail's citizen petition. The court noted that
the FDA was already aware of one of the issues raised in the
defendant's citizen petition-the issue of dose dumping-but that the
FDA had not issued any requirements regarding this concern.88 The
court found that
the FDA's awareness about the dangers of dose dumping ...
do[es] not mean that those two requests were not "reasonably
calculated to elicit a favorable outcome." The outcomes were
not yet set in stone, and even if they were, 21 C.F.R. § 10.30
permits citizen petitions to amend or revoke regulations. To
characterize these granted requests as sham requests and
eliminate Noerr-Pennington immunity merely because the FDA
was already aware of the concerns brought up therein would
unreasonably curtail the First Amendment right to petition the
government and influence policy.189
Biovail's petition also included an argument requesting that the
FDA require generic manufacturers to measure levels of certain
metabolites, but this request was contrary to an FDA guidance
document.19 0 The court reasoned that Biovail's petition failed to
provide factual or legal support for deviating from FDA guidance,
and thus, Biovail could not "realistically expect success on the merits
of the metabolites evaluation request."'91 Nevertheless, the court
ultimately granted summary judgment as to the citizen petition
because the plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as
to the causal connection between the unsuccessful petitions and the
alleged antitrust injury.192
188. In re Wellbutrin XL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66312, at *69.
189. Id. at *79 (quoting Prof'1 Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993)). The court reasoned that the inquiry for the sham exception to the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine is forward looking and that here, the Plaintiffs were asking the
court
to strip citizen petition requests that were granted by the FDA from Noerr-
Pennington immunity merely because the FDA was already aware of the concerns
discussed therein. But to do so would discourage companies from attempting to
shape the development of and contribute to the discourse surrounding FDA
policies once the FDA becomes aware of an issue.
Id. at *77. This statement recognizes the policy of encouraging parties to submit petitions
in an effort to further help ensure safety.
190. Id. at *88--93.
191. Id. at *93.
192. Id. at *115-16.
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B. Factors Supporting Possible Finding of Sham Petition
Based on this case law, scholars have identified several factors
leading courts to find that a genuine issue of material fact remains
regarding whether a citizen petition falls under the sham exception of
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine (thus allowing a plaintiff's antitrust
claim based on an alleged sham citizen petition to survive a motion
for summary judgment or motion to dismiss).193 These factors include:
(1) whether the citizen petition was filed on the eve of the brand-
name pharmaceutical's patent term expiration; (2) whether the FDA
approved the generic's ANDA on the same date it rejected the
corresponding citizen petition; (3) whether the relief requested
contradicts the FDA's regulations and practices; and (4) whether the
tone of the FDA's rejection letter suggests that the petition was
objectively baseless.19 4
"Suspect timing," or whether the citizen petition was filed on the
eve of the brand-name pharmaceutical's patent term expiration, and
thus, the eve of potential generic ANDA approval, is a significant
factor courts have considered as tending to support a finding of
baselessness.195 In In re Flonase Antitrust Litigation, where the court
denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, Roxane alleged that "just
days after the expiration of the statutory exclusivity period for GSK's
Flonase, and on the eve of what could have been the FDA's approval
of Roxane Laboratories' ANDA, GSK filed the first in a series of
objectively baseless citizen petitions."'96 These petitions were
submitted nearly two years after Roxane had filed its ANDA
application with the FDA.'97 Similarly, in Louisiana Wholesale Drug
Co., another case where the court denied the defendant's motion to
dismiss, the court noted that Aventis filed its citizen petition "one
year after the generic manufacturers submitted their ANDAs for
FDA approval when no new health and safety information on the
loading dose or leflunomide in general and no new FDA regulations
on labeling had occurred."198 In comparison, in In re Wellbutrin XL
Antitrust Litigation, rather than being filed on the eve of the brand-
193. See Silber et al., supra note 8, at 36-39.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 36-37. While this factor would seem to more appropriately apply to the
subjective prong of the Noerr-Pennington sham exception test, courts have also applied it
to the objective prong. Id. at 37.
196. Complaint of Roxane Laboratories, Inc. at 7, In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 795 F.
Supp. 2d 300 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (No. 09-cv-1638).
197. In re Flonase, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 304-05.
198. La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Sanofi-Aventis, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3611, at *14-17
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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name drug's patent expiration, the defendant's citizen petition was
filed several months prior to the expiration of the Wellbutrin XL
patent.199 There, the court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss.200
A second factor considered by courts is the timing of the FDA's
approval of an ANDA compared to the rejection date of the citizen
petition concerning that ANDA. Courts have generally considered
the FDA's concurrent rejection of the brand-name manufacturer's
citizen petition and approval of the generic manufacturer's ANDA to
indicate that the citizen petition actually caused delay to generic
entry, thus supporting the existence of an antitrust injury.20' This
conclusion is significant because proving antitrust injury, which can be
difficult in this context, is a requirement for a successful antitrust
challenge. 202 The difficulty of proving an antitrust injury-showing
that a baseless citizen petition was the cause of any delay in FDA
approval of the related ANDA-arises in the context of citizen
petitions because "[d]isaggregating antitrust injury can be difficult in
any case, but even more so where the conduct was the subject of a
multifaceted, confidential regulatory review process." 203 However,
when a brand-name manufacturer submits multiple citizen petitions,
some of which are successful, concurrent citizen petition rejection and
ANDA approval may not provide evidence of an antitrust injury.204
As some scholars have noted, "[w]here some aspects of the petition
were allegedly groundless and others were not, it can be a challenge
to ascribe any delay to the allegedly 'sham' component of a broader
petition.. . . Such difficulties are amplified by the courts' reluctance to
delve into the decision making processes of expert agencies. "205
Another factor that courts consider when examining whether the
defendant's citizen petition may fall under the sham exception is the
FDA's regulations and practices. In some cases, brand-name
manufacturers, whom courts typically classify as "sophisticated
199. See In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., No. 08-2431, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
66312, at *19-21 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2012).
200. Id. at *116.
201. See Silber et al., supra note 8, at 39.
202. In re Wellbutrin XL, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66312, at *52 ("The elements of an
antitrust claim are (1) a violation of the antitrust laws; (2) individual injury resulting from
that violation; and (3) measurable damages.").
203. Royall & Lipton, supra note 125, at 24 (citing M. Sean Royall, Disaggregation of
Antitrust Damages, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 311 (1997)).
204. See, e.g., In re Wellbutrin, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66312.
205. Royall & Lipton, supra note 125, at 24 (citing Mt. Hood Stages v. Greyhound
Corp., 616 F.2d 394, 398-400 (9th Cir. 1980); Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm.,
Inc., No. 03-00887, slip op. at 4 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2009)).
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parties," have requested relief that is contrary to current FDA
regulations and practices. For example, in Louisiana Wholesale Drug
Co., Aventis sought to require generic manufacturers to produce
100mg tablets in order to succeed with ANDAs.206 At trial, Louisiana
Wholesale offered evidence that the relief requested in Aventis's
citizen petition was contrary to FDA regulations and practices. 207 The
court supported its conclusion that Aventis's petition was subjectively
baseless by noting that, on its own product labels, Aventis had
previously cross-referenced pharmaceuticals that it did not actually
manufacture.20 s Under this factor, courts have "an expectation that
[the manufacturers of brand-name pharmaceuticals] have knowledge
of FDA practices and procedures," thus tending to show subjective
baselessness on the part of the manufacturers.209
In examining the objective baselessness prong of the sham
exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, courts have frequently
emphasized the wording of the FDA's rejection of the defendant's
citizen petition.21 0 For example, in In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser
Antitrust Litigation, the court emphasized the language of the FDA
rejection letter, which stated that the petition "had no convincing
evidence." 2 1  Also, in Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., the court noted
the FDA's statement that Aventis's petition "seem[ed] to be based on
a false premise,"212 and in In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation, the
FDA response to the citizen petition provided that "Biovail [should]
not be permitted to shield its market share." 213 Similarly, in regard to
In re Flonase Antitrust Litigation, the FDA stated that "[t]he policies
behind Hatch-Waxman dictate that GSK [should] not be permitted to
shield its market share when the Agency has reasonably determined
that competing generic drug products may be approved."214 In
contrast, if the FDA's rejection letter indicated that the petition
contained arguments that were considered legitimate by the FDA,
206. La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Sanofi-Aventis, No. 07-CIV-7343, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 77206, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
207. Id. at *9.
208. Id. at *8.
209. Silber et al., supra note 8, at 38.
210. Id. at 38-39.
211. In re DDA VP, 585 F.3d 677, 694 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Complaint at 115, La.
Wholesale Drug Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77206 (No. 07-CIV-7343)).
212. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77206, at *7 (internal quotations
omitted).
213. Letter from Randall W. Lutter, supra note 184, at 16.
214. Letter from Randall W. Lutter, supra note 165, at 24.
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such language would likely provide evidence pointing away from
objective baselessness.215
IV. AMENDMENTS TO THE HATCH-WAXMAN AcT-DID THEY DO
ENOUGH?
As the FDA has acknowledged, the 2007 FDAAA has not
been entirely successful in "discouraging the submission of petitions
that do not raise valid scientific issues and are intended primarily to
delay the approval of competitive drug products." 2 16 Consequently,
several commentators have recommended various approaches to
address the concerns raised by abuse of the citizen petition process.
Some scholars have argued that only parties with a "non-
commercial interest" in a generic pharmaceutical seeking FDA
approval should be permitted to file citizen petitions relating to that
generic drug's ANDA.217 Such a requirement would prevent brand-
name manufacturers from abusing the citizen petition process in an
effort to extend their monopoly beyond their pharmaceutical's patent
term. However, such a requirement would also prevent these same
manufacturers, who arguably have the greatest depth of knowledge
about a particular pharmaceutical, from raising any valid concerns
regarding the bioequivalence and safety of a proposed generic
equivalent.218
Further, scholars have urged the FDA to "exercis[e] its
discretion to refer unsuccessful citizen petitions to the FTC or
Department of Justice."1 Such actions by the FDA would
theoretically discourage the abuse of the citizen petition process.2 20
Another proposed measure for penalizing parties engaging in sham
petitioning was set forth in the Citizen Petition Fairness and Accuracy
Act of 2006, a bill which would have enabled the Department of
215. Silber et al., supra note 8, at 38-39.
216. 2010 FDA REPORT, supra note 82, at 5.
217. See, e.g., Giles, supra note 39, at 375 ("Pioneer drug companies should be
prevented from filing Citizen Petitions relating to the approval of an ANDA. These
petitions should be reserved for those who have a noncommercial interest in the drug.").
218. Cf E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139
(1961) ("Indeed, it is quite probably people with just such a hope of personal advantage
who provide much of the information upon which governments must act. A construction
of the Sherman Act that would disqualify people from taking a public position on matters
in which they are financially interested would thus deprive the government of a valuable
source of information and, at the same time, deprive the people of their right to petition in
the very instances in which that right may be of the most importance to them.").
219. Lee, supra note 30, at 125.
220. See id. ("Abusing government processes will continue so long as there is no
penalty for engaging in this type of conduct.").
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Health and Human Services to sanction parties abusing the citizen
petition process with fines of up to $1 million and either suspension or
revocation of the violator's right to file citizen petitions in the
future.22 1 This proposed legislation was never enacted.222 However,
referring unsuccessful citizen petitions to the FTC or Department of
Justice or imposing the sanctions described in the Citizen Petition
Fairness and Accuracy Act of 2006 could have a chilling effect on the
citizen petition process by discouraging parties from voicing their
concerns for fear of the repercussions that may result if their petitions
are denied. Because the parties most frequently accused of filing
sham citizen petitions-namely, manufacturers of brand-name
pharmaceuticals whose patent term is nearing its expiration date-are
the very parties who arguably have the most intimate knowledge
regarding a particular pharmaceutical, any legislation aimed at
addressing sham citizen petitioning should encourage these parties to
raise valid concerns regarding the safety of a proposed generic
equivalent rather than risk a chilling effect on the citizen petition
process.
A better approach would be to use the factors that courts have
relied on when denying defendant brand-name manufacturers'
motions to dismiss to formulate a solution to the sham petitioning
problem. As discussed in Part III.B, the factors considered by courts
include (1) suspect timing, (2) concurrent petition denial and ANDA
approval, (3) FDA regulations and practices, and (4) the language of
the FDA's rejection letter.223
A. Suspect Timing
One scholar has addressed the first factor, suspect timing, as
follows:
The FDA could make an additional regulatory improvement by
imposing a time frame for citizen petition submissions. Similar
to the predefined comment period for citizens to respond to a
proposed FDA rule, citizens should be given a defined forty-
221. Citizen Petition Fairness and Accuracy Act of 2006, S. 3981, 109th Cong. (2006).
222. The proposed bill was read twice and then referred to the Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions without taking a Roll Call vote. Citizen Petition Fairness
and Accuracy Act of 2006, S. 3981, 109th Cong., http://beta.congress.gov/bill/109th/senate-
bill/3981 (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). The bill was reintroduced in 2007 but was again
referred to a committee and ultimately died. Citizen Petition Fairness and Accuracy Act
of 2007, S. 25, 110th Cong., http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/s25 (last visited Nov.
7, 2013).
223. See supra Part III.B.
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five day comment period to raise health and safety concerns in
response to ANDA applications. This would avoid eleventh-
hour petitions and enable the FDA to rule in time for an
approved generic to go to market without an unjust delay.
These regulatory reforms would decrease the incentives for
brand-name companies to submit sham petitions and help to
safeguard the citizen petition process.224
While this approach does address the concern of suspect timing,
its scope is overly broad, reaching many parties beyond the brand-
name manufacturers who are almost exclusively the parties accused of
filing sham citizen petitions. This broad scope consequently reduces
the public health benefit that can result from including as many
citizen petitions in the ANDA approval process as possible.
Instead, the scope of this recommendation should be narrowed
to brand-name manufacturers with a commercial interest in the
generic pharmaceutical's entry to the market. Those who
manufacture the brand-name pharmaceutical whose patent term is
nearing expiration should be required to submit their citizen petitions
a reasonable amount of time, perhaps 150 days, before their patent's
expiration date in order for the FDA to consider their petitions in the
ANDA approval process. Because the FDA must respond to citizen
petitions within 150 days of their submission,225 this approach would
enable the FDA to resolve all citizen petitions submitted by brand-
name manufacturers with a commercial interest prior to the
expiration of the brand-name pharmaceutical's patent term. Further,
under this approach, the FDA should still have the ability to consider
petitions submitted by brand-name manufacturers with a commercial
interest after the proposed 150-day deadline, but the Agency should
no longer be required to respond to such petitions within 150 days of
their submission.226 Moreover, when considering late petitions by
brand-name manufacturers, the FDA should be prohibited from
making a decision to delay ANDA approval unless it determines,
prior to the brand-name pharmaceutical's patent term expiration, that
the concerns raised in the petition have public health implications.
224. Lee, supra note 30, at 126.
225. 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(F) (2012).
226. Relaxing the requirement that the FDA respond to all petitions within 150 days
helps address the FDA's concern that "[t]hough many 505(q) petitions do not necessarily
raise issues that are important to the public health, the statute requires FDA to prioritize
these petitions above other matters ... that do raise important health concerns." 2011
FDA REPORT, supra note 88, at 6.
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Under this Comment's approach, the "nine-day delay" scenario
discussed in the FDA's 2010 report 227 and the "seventy-eight-day
delay" scenario discussed in the FDA's 2011 report 228 would no longer
be possible. The approach narrowly addresses the concern of brand-
name manufacturers using sham citizen petitions to achieve
anticompetitive ends, while preserving the full extent of other parties'
constitutional right to petition the government. Parties without a
financial interest in the approval of the generic ANDA would still be
able to submit petitions up until the ANDA's approval, thus
maximizing the benefit to the public health that can be achieved from
the citizen petition process.
B. Concurrent Petition Denial and ANDA Approval
Under the approach detailed above, the second factor,
concurrent petition denial and ANDA approval, becomes irrelevant.
Brand-name manufacturers with a commercial interest in a generic
pharmaceutical's entry to the market would generally be prohibited
from submitting citizen petitions within 150 days of the end of the
brand-name pharmaceutical's patent term, thus enabling the FDA to
respond to their petitions prior to patent term expiration. The only
situation in which a brand-name manufacturer would be able to
submit a citizen petition that delays ANDA approval is if the FDA
were to determine, prior to the brand-name pharmaceutical's patent
term expiration, that the petition implicates public health concerns.
C. FDA Regulations and Practices
The third factor, considering FDA regulations and practices to
determine whether the petition is objectively baseless, should be
addressed by creating an irrebuttable presumption that when a party
requests relief that is contrary to current FDA regulations and
practices, the requested relief does not have public health
implications. As a result of this irrebuttable presumption, under
section 505(q), the FDA would be prohibited from delaying approval
of an ANDA based on such a petition.229
For example, Aventis, the defendant brand-name manufacturer
in Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., sought to require generic
manufacturers to produce 100mg tablets before receiving ANDA
227. 2010 FDA REPORT, supra note 82, at 3.
228. 2011 FDA REPORT, supra note 88, at 3.
229. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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approval. 230 This request was contrary to FDA regulations and
practices,23 1 and therefore, under this Comment's proposed statutory
scheme, the FDA would be required to presume that Aventis's
request does not have public health implications. Thus, the FDA
would be unable to delay the approval of an ANDA based on this
request.
D. The Language of the FDA's Rejection Letter
Finally, courts have used the fourth factor, the language of the
FDA's rejection letter, as evidence of objective baselessness.23 2 Some
commentators have recommended granting the FDA the express
authority to identify certain petitions as "objectively baseless" and
making such a determination final and appealable only in court.233
Thus, for petitions classified by the FDA as "objectively baseless," if
the petitioner elects not to appeal the FDA's determination, the
objective prong of the sham exception would be deemed satisfied,
and only the subjective prong would be at issue in court.234 However,
this approach may discourage parties from voicing their concerns to
the FDA through citizen petitions for fear of losing one prong of
Noerr-Pennington protection in any subsequent court proceedings if
the FDA finds their petitions to be "objectively baseless."
Rather than making this determination final, such a
determination of objective baselessness by the FDA should instead
shift the burden of proof in any resulting court proceedings.
Therefore, instead of the plaintiff carrying the burden of proving that
the defendant's petition was objectively baseless, the defendant
would have the burden of proving that its petition was not objectively
baseless. 235 This approach, along with the other recommendations
discussed in this Section, would balance the competing goals of
discouraging parties from abusing the citizen petition process to
230. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 154-62 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 210-15 and accompanying text.
233. Lee, supra note 30, at 125.
234. Id.
235. The court in In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation discussed the standard of
proof for objective baselessness in a Noerr-Pennington case. In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust
Litig., No. 08-2431, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66312, at *16-19 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2012). The
court noted that there is disagreement among the courts as to whether preponderance of
the evidence or clear and convincing evidence is the appropriate standard of proof. Id.
Because the cases addressing sham petitioning by brand-name drug manufacturers are
generally civil cases, the burden of proof for establishing that a petition is not objectively
baseless under this proposed scheme should be preponderance of the evidence.
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achieve anticompetitive ends and encouraging parties to submit
petitions raising concerns about the potential safety of a pending
ANDA.
CONCLUSION
With generic pharmaceuticals costing an average of eighty to
eighty-five percent less than their brand-name counterparts,236 access
to generic pharmaceuticals can significantly benefit American
consumers. However, entry of a generic pharmaceutical into the
market can also have a detrimental impact on the brand-name
manufacturer's profitability.237 As described in this Comment, some
brand-name manufacturers have attempted to extend their
pharmaceuticals' exclusivity through various tactics, including filing
sham citizen petitions with the FDA in an effort to delay the FDA's
approval of generic equivalents.
Because the ability to file citizen petitions with the FDA
originates in the First Amendment, parties filing such petitions enjoy
broad protection from antitrust liability. Further, Congress's attempt
to curb abuse of the petition process through the FDAAA has not
been entirely successful in eliminating sham petitions. This Comment
proposes an alternative regulatory approach that addresses
outstanding concerns of anticompetitive abuse of the citizen petition
process. This approach balances two competing goals by discouraging
parties from abusing the petition process while also encouraging
parties to submit petitions raising concerns regarding the potential
safety of generic pharmaceuticals awaiting FDA approval.
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